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International agreements do not generally address issues of secondary liability for 
infringement of intellectual property law rights, and there is little international consensus 
on this topic, even among the major industrialized nations.  National laws tend to vary 
considerably regarding the scope and extent of secondary liability, with U.S. tending to 
be more liberal with the imposition of such liability than most of its major trading 
partners. This lack of uniformity in secondary liability rules in the international arena 
makes the evaluation of infringement liability in that setting uncertain and makes it 
difficult for business to effectively plan international intellectual property strategies. 
Given the global nature of modern business activity, the time has come to open serious 
dialogue on the advisability of creating uniform international standards for secondary 
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liability for infringement of intellectual property rights.  Unfortunately, instead of 
focusing on the full panoply of situations in which secondary liability for intellectual 
property can occur, and the range of considerations that might affect imposition of such 
liability, such as notions of respondeat superior, intent, authorization, and control, the 
current debate has settled on the imposition of secondary liability in the peer-to-peer file-
swapping arena. This narrow focus may well make it more difficult, if not impossible, to 
reach consensus on this important issue. By stepping back and reframing the issue in 
more general terms of secondary liability outside the digital environment, we can more 
easily contemplate important questions such as the pros and cons of imposing such 
liability, the situations in which such liability makes sense, and the manner in which we 
balance the rights of the public and goals of free trade and markets against the need to 




SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
INFRINGEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA:  
FRAMING THE DIALOGUE 
 Secondary liability is liability that is imposed upon a defendant who did not 
directly commit the wrongdoing at issue, but who the law nonetheless holds responsible 
for the injuries caused. (Bartholomew & Tehranian, 2006, p. 1366) Imposition of 
secondary liability has been justified both on efficiency grounds (i.e., as a mechanism to 
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shift costs to those in the best position to prevent future harm), and on moral grounds 
(i.e., those who intend to bring about a harm should be held liable even if another party 
was the direct cause of the harm incurred by the plaintiff). (Bartholomew & Tehranian, 
2006, p. 1366) 
 International treaties currently generally do not address issues of secondary 
liability for infringement of intellectual property rights, and international consensus on 
this topic is limited at best, even among the major industrialized nations. Legal protection 
of intellectual property rights is inherently territorial in reach (Holbrook, 2004, p. 758), 
absurd as that might seem in a world of increasing intertwined global activity.  
 Absent a governing international agreement imposing specific obligations and 
fostering global harmonization, each nation is free to create its own rules and levels of 
legal protection regarding intellectual property rights, and innovators must seek 
protection of their copyrights, patents, trademarks, or trade secrets within the confines of 
the legal regimes of the jurisdictions in which they operate. (Thomas, 2005, p. CRS-5) 
National laws vary considerably regarding the availability and extent of secondary 
liability, with the United States tending to be more liberal with the imposition of such 
liability than most of its major trading partners. This lack of uniformity in secondary 
liability rules in the international arena makes the evaluation of infringement liability in 
that setting uncertain and makes it difficult for businesses to effectively plan international 
intellectual property strategies. 
 The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in MGM v. Grokster, which 
has implications for the extent and scope of secondary liability for both the patent and 
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copyright law fields under U.S. law (Oswald, 2006), highlights the uncertainty over 
international standards for secondary liability. The role of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement in the international arena was debated in the amici briefs in 
Grokster (IRO Amici Brief, 2005; Sharman Amicus Brief, 2005), and has been a topic of 
some interest among U.S. commentators post-Grokster as well. However, the discussion, 
both domestically and internationally, seems to have shifted in focus and narrowed 
considerably in scope. Instead of discussing the full panoply of situations in which 
secondary liability for intellectual property infringement can occur and the range of 
considerations that might affect imposition of such liability, such as notions of respondeat 
superior, intent, authorization, and control, the debate has settled on the imposition of 
secondary liability in the digital arena and, more particularly, on secondary liability for 
peer-to-peer file-swapping. While Grokster itself was a file-swapping case, the  
Supreme Court’s decision had broader implications for imposition of secondary liability 
for intellectual property infringement generally (Oswald, 2006); consideration of those 
broader implications is seemingly being ignored in present discourse. 
At some level, it is understandable why the current dialogue on secondary liability 
for intellectual property infringement focuses on the digital environment. As Marybeth 
Peters, the U.S. Register of Copyrights, recently noted, the advent of and rapid growth in 
digital technologies over the past ten years has now made it possible for a single 
individual to make and distribute millions of infringing copies over the Internet with little 
effort or investment. (Peters, 2006) Peer-to-peer file-sharing raises the stakes even 
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further, allowing millions of consumers to link in a network and engage in copyright 
infringement at an unprecedented scale. (Peters, 2006) 
 As Peters noted, it is difficult for copyright holders to enforce their rights in this 
peer-to-peer setting, in part because of the difficulty of identifying, locating, and suing 
each individual infringer, and in part because the individual users are often judgment-
proof and lack the financial resources to compensate for their infringement. (Peters, 
2006) In the United States, copyright holders turn to secondary liability in such instances, 
seeking to hold the companies that facilitate these networks liable for their end users’ 
infringement. The solution is imperfect--imposition of secondary liability for intellectual 
property infringement is problematic under U.S. law and the rules can be uncertain—but 
nonetheless, secondary liability is clearly recognized and embraced by the U.S. legal 
system, and offers some degree of protection for intellectual property rights holders. 
 The picture is much less clear at the international level. As discussed below, some 
foreign jurisdictions do recognize secondary liability for intellectual property 
infringement. Indeed, secondary liability can be of critical importance in this setting for 
intellectual property holders seeking to protect their intellectual property rights. For 
example, if the foreign jurisdiction’s laws do not provide for exclusive distribution or 
importation rights, secondary liability may be used to bring distributors, importers, and 
retailers within the purview of the copyright laws, or to provide necessary relief to 
copyright holders where the direct infringer is not within the court’s jurisdiction. 
(Goldstein, 2001, p. 270) There is, however, as Peters noted, “very little uniformity 
among national laws as to secondary liability, whether it be liability for a company that 
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uses peer-to-peer technology to encourage infringement, or . . . an Internet service 
provider that provides facilities used by others to infringe.” (Peters, 2006) For example, 
as discussed below, foreign jurisdictions may regard as direct infringement behavior that 
U.S. law would classify as indirect infringement instead, or may not classify as 
infringement at all behavior that would clearly be actionable under U.S. or other 
countries’ laws. The net result is an inevitable degree of inconsistency in legal rules 
around the world that creates uncertainty for intellectual property rights holders, business, 
and other global actors. 
Given the global nature of modern business generally and the inherent worldwide 
reach of Internet-based business activities in particular, the time has come to open serious 
dialogue on the advisability of creating uniform international standards for secondary 
liability for intellectual property law infringement. Before we can evaluate the wisdom or 
necessity of international standards for secondary liability for intellectual property 
infringement, however, we need to understand the current playing field. Currently, we 
have a mish-mash of national rules regarding secondary liability, with United States law 
being considerably more likely to contemplate imposition of secondary liability than the 
laws of many other nations. This is not to say that the American system should 
necessarily serve as the paradigm for global standards, but the considerable diversity in 
global thought on the issue of secondary liability for intellectual property infringement 
highlights the important fact that not all participants in discussion of this topic start from 
the same place in terms of legal theory and practice. 
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In addition, we need to carefully consider the parameters of potential international 
harmonization of secondary liability rules. The current debate focuses on a subset of 
copyright law, even though secondary liability has application in other areas of 
intellectual property law, such as patent and trademark as well. On the other hand, it is 
logical that the discussion of secondary liability in the international context should begin 
with and center on copyright law, because modern technology makes illegal copying and, 
hence, copyright infringement, easier to achieve, because ease of distribution of digital 
copies in particular means that territoriality notions break down quicker in this arena, and 
because copyright law is already the subject of substantial efforts to achieve international 
harmonization. 
It is unfortunate, however, that the debate has already been artificially constrained 
and, in effect, tainted by focusing primarily on peer-to-peer file-swapping activities, 
which pose idiosyncratic and difficult issues of copyright protection and infringement, 
complex questions regarding culpability and lawful versus unlawful uses, and more 
emotional reactions to the nature of the suits being brought. As the Canadian Supreme 
Court noted, the internet poses unique problems for copyright law: 
The capacity of the Internet to disseminate ‘works of the arts and 
intellect’ is one of the great innovations of the information age. Its use 
should be facilitated rather than discouraged, but this should not be done 
unfairly at the expense of those who created the works of arts and intellect 
in the first place. 
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The issue of the proper balance in matters of copyright plays out 
against the much larger conundrum of trying to apply national laws to a 
fast-evolving technology that in essence respects no national boundaries. 
(SOCAN, 2004, ¶¶ 40-41) 
Intellectual property holders in this arena have a choice between suing individual 
users (often impecunious and thus judgment-proof college students or parents who were 
unaware of their minor children’s downloading activities)1 or suing the service providers 
who indirectly made the infringement possible by providing a service that typically can 
be used for both lawful and unlawful purposes.  
Because of both the negative publicity and the logistical difficulties associated 
with suing the multitude of direct infringers, secondary liability often appears an 
appealing strategy for intellectual property rights holders in the file-swapping arena. The 
net result, however, is that the debate over secondary liability in the international context 
is beginning in the often factually-murky and emotionally-charged environment of peer-
to-peer file-swapping. If we could remove the debate from this highly-charged sphere, 
and back it out into a more macro discussion of secondary liability generally—the pros 
and cons of imposing such liability, the situations in which such liability makes sense, 
and the manner in which we balance the rights of the public and goals of free trade and 
markets against the need to encourage innovation by protecting the rights of the 
innovators—the debate would proceed more easily and would be less cluttered by the 
complex baggage of the digital environment. 
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I. SECONDARY LIABILTY FOR INFRINGMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER U.S. LAW: GROKSTER AND ITS 
ANTECEDENTS 
 
 A. Theory of Secondary Liability Under U.S. Law 
 In American law, secondary liability in general originates in tort law, as a 
mechanism for holding liable a defendant who did not directly cause the harm at issue but 
who should nonetheless be held liable for it. (Bartholomew and Tehranian, 2006, pp. 
1366-69; A & M Records, 2001, pp. 1019-1024). Under traditional tort law, secondary 
liability took one of two forms: vicarious liability or contributory liability. Vicarious 
liability seeks to hold the defendant liable because of his or her relationship with the 
direct wrongdoer (e.g., a master-servant relationship), and does not require that the 
defendant “know” of the wrongdoing. Rather, the focus is on whether the indirect 
wrongdoer controls or has the right to control the direct wrongdoer. (Bartholomew and 
Tehranian, 2006, p. 1366) Generally, vicarious infringement requires a showing of: (1) 
direct infringement by a primary wrongdoer; (2) a direct financial benefit to the 
secondary wrongdoer from the direct infringement; and (3) a right and ability on the part 
of the secondary wrongdoer to control and supervise the actions of the primary 
wrongdoer. (Pessach, 2007, p. 91 n.6) 
Contributory infringement, on the other hand, requires a showing of: (1) direct 
infringement by the primary wrongdoer; (2) knowledge of the direct infringement by the 
secondary wrongdoer; and (3) a material contribution by the secondary wrongdoer to the 
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direct infringement.  (Pessach, 2007, p. 91 n.7; Bartholomew and Tehranian, 2006, p. 
1367) Contributory infringement thus does have a knowledge requirement in the sense 
that the defendant must have deliberately and purposefully assisted or encouraged the 
direct wrongdoer, and must have recognized the wrongful nature of the underlying act of 
direct infringement.  (Bartholomew and Tehranian, 2006, p. 1366; A & M Records, 2001, 
p. 1020) 
There are both pragmatic and philosophical reasons proffered for imposing 
secondary liability. In practical terms, secondary liability provides a means of affording 
intellectual property rights holders relief in situations where suing the direct infringer is  
impracticable (e.g., because the direct infringer is financially incapable of compensating 
fully for the damages, or is a customer of the intellectual property rights holder), or where 
the actual infringement by each direct infringer is so small that the costs of litigation 
would greatly exceed the recovery, even though the aggregate damages caused by the 
direct infringement might be very large. (Chisum, 2007, [5], § 17.04[4](f); Lemley, 2005, 
p. 228; Aimster, 2003, p. 645; Groenning, 2005).2  As one commentator put it, “chasing 
individual consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.” 
(Picker, 2002, p. 442) In these instances, it may be more practical to sue the indirect 
infringers who, in many instances, may well be more morally culpable for the 
infringement than the direct infringer anyway. As the United States Supreme Court noted 
in Grokster: “When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it 
may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct 
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying 
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device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.” 
(Grokster, 2005, p. 930).  
In more theoretical terms, secondary liability can be justified on either efficiency 
or moral grounds as well: “First, secondary liability serves a fundamentally economic 
purpose by shifting risks from direct to indirect infringers. Second, secondary liability 
law serves a moral end by placing fault on a party deserving of punishment even though 
that party did not commit the underlying infringing act.” (Bartholomew & Tehranian, 
2006, p. 1419). 
However, counterbalancing American law’s broad view of secondary liability is 
the notion that secondary liability ought not be imposed on inappropriate parties or in a 
manner that would impede the stream of lawful commerce. (Lemley, 2005, p. 228; 
Lichtman & Landes, 2003, pp. 409-410) The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized the need to “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand 
for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights 
of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” (Sony., 1984, p. 
422) This inherent tension between protection of intellectual property holders’ rights and 
the promotion of free commerce and open markets has important implications for the 
development of American legal doctrine relating to secondary liability. 
 
B. General Development of Secondary Liability Under U.S. Law 
Secondary liability for patent and copyright infringement has had a rather 
muddled legislative and judicial history in the United States. Notions of secondary 
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liability developed initially in the patent law area, first as common law, and then as 
statutory law, and were subsequently imported to the copyright area as a form of common 
law. U.S. copyright law lacks a statutory basis for secondary liability even today, making 
the basis and rules for secondary liability for intellectual property infringement under 
U.S. rather unclear. 
The first U.S. patent act, enacted in 1790, embraced the notion of liability for 
direct infringement of a patent. Indirect patent infringement liability, on the other hand, 
developed initially as form of common law. Over a century ago, the courts, recognizing 
that imposing only liability for direct infringement might well allow parties whose 
culpability in the infringing actions is even greater than that of the direct infringer to 
escape liability, developed a doctrine of contributory liability for patent infringement.  
Initially, contributory liability was applied to those who did not directly infringe 
another’s patent, yet who nonetheless helped others to infringe by supplying a component 
part specially adapted to infringement. (Adam, 2006, pp. 371-372) A second line of cases 
also emerged, addressing those situations where the component had non-infringing uses 
but was used for infringing purposes. (Oswald, 2005, pp. 227-228) While the courts were 
reluctant to automatically hold liable a defendant who sold a component that had both 
infringing and non-infringing uses, they did hold defendants liable where the evidence 
indicated that those defendants were actually encouraging infringement by the end users 
(i.e., the direct infringers). (Chisum, 2007, [5], § 17.02(1); Oswald, 2006, pp. 227-228) 
These notions of direct and secondary liability were codified in the Patent Act of 
1952, in Section 271. Section 271(a) of the Patent Act addresses direct infringement, 
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providing that one who practices the patented invention shall be liable for infringement. 
Direct infringement is in effect a strict liability provision; (Jurgens, 1996, p. 1770 n.2) 
lack of intent to infringe or lack of bad faith may mitigate the availability of enhanced 
damages for infringement, but does not obviate liability itself. (Oswald, 2006, p. 229) 
The Patent Act separates the common law’s original notion of a single type of secondary 
liability into two distinct causes of action: inducement of infringement (codified in 
Section 271(b)) and contributory infringement (codified in Section 271(c)). Under the 
Patent Act, secondary liability of either type is inextricably linked to direct infringement, 
and neither contributory infringement liability nor liability for inducement to infringe can 
attach unless another party is first found to have directly infringed. (Oswald, 2006, pp. 
228-229)  
Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act has no express language creating 
secondary liability for infringement. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has 
long held that secondary liability for copyright infringement is actionable under U.S. law. 
The Court has stated: 
The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not 
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain 
parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For 
vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the 
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader 
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one 
individual accountable for the actions of another. 
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(Sony, 1984, p. 435) 
  A leading treatise identifies three theories of secondary liability under copyright 
law: (1) respondeat superior, in which the master is held liable for the infringement of 
the agent; (2) vicarious liability, which exists when the defendant (a) has “the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing conduct; and (b) has “‘an obvious and direct financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials’”; and (3) contributory liability, 
which takes the form of either (a) personal conduct that results in participation in or 
furthering of the infringement, or (b) “contribution of machinery or goods that provide 
the means to infringe.” (Nimmer, 2007, [3], § 12.04[A]) 
 
  C. MGM v. Grokster 
 It was against this convoluted background that the dispute in MGM v. Grokster 
emerged. Grokster was not the United States Supreme Court’s first foray into secondary 
liability for copyright infringement. Two decades earlier, in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court had held that the manufacturer of a 
VCR could not be held liable for contributory copyright infringement, even if some (or 
many) of the consumers used the product to infringe copyrights, because the VCR was 
capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses (such as time-shifting for 
personal viewing).  The advent of the Internet and the evolution of digital technology, 
however, raised the stakes in the secondary liability struggle considerably beyond that 
found in the much simpler VCR context, as the advances in technology allowed 
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infringing copies to now be made very rapidly and inexpensively, as opposed to the 
comparatively slow and cumbersome mechanism for copying provided by VCRs. 
Defendants Grokster Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. distributed free 
software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer 
networks, thus avoiding the central service system and mediated file transfers between 
users of the ill-fated Napster system. Because Grokster and StreamCast did not have 
central servers, they contended that they had no knowledge of which files users were 
copying or when, and had little or no control over the users’ behavior, and thus could 
not be held secondarily liable for any direct infringement engaged in by their end users. 
(Oswald, 2006, p. 233) 
 The plaintiffs consisted of the major movie studios and record companies and 
various music publishers and songwriters. They argued that the defendants should be 
held secondarily liable for the direct infringement of their copyrighted works by the end 
users because the defendants’ software enabled the unauthorized transfer of copyrighted 
works and because the defendants intended, promoted, and profited from these acts of 
infringement. (Oswald, 2006, p. 233-234) 
 The defendants’ technology could facilitate the transfer of any type of electronic 
file, both infringing and non-infringing. However, the plaintiffs produced evidence that 
the software was used primarily to distribute copyrighted works in violation of the 
copyright owners’ rights and without the payment of royalties, and that the defendants 
had taken active steps to encourage this extensive direct infringement by end users. In 
addition, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the defendants’ business models were 
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financially dependent upon this infringement. While the lower courts ruled for the 
defendants, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding instead that: “one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown 
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for 
the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” (Grokster, 2005, p. 919) In effect, the 
Grokster Court stated that it was not knowledge that leads to contributory infringement, 
but rather intent. According to the Court: “One infringes contributorily by intentionally 
inducing or encouraging direct infringement . . . .” (Grokster, 2005, p. 930)  Moreover, 
the necessary intent must be shown “by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement.” (Grokster, 2005, p. 919) 
The Grokster Court also recast Sony in terms of intent, not knowledge, stating: 
“Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause 
infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial 
lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement.” (Grokster, 
2005, p. 933) According to the Grokster Court, the Sony rule “limits imputing culpable 
intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product.” 
(Grokster, 2005, p. 934) This, the Grokster Court stated, was true even though Sony 
knew its product could be used for infringing purposes; the key was that “[t]here was no 
evidence that Sony had expressed an object of” encouraging the product to be used in an 
infringing manner, nor had it “taken active steps to increase its profits from” such 
infringing activities. (Grokster, 2005, p. 931) 
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Although a full analysis of Grokster is beyond the scope of this Chapter, it is fair 
to say that the Grokster Court’s treatment of secondary liability in the copyright arena 
was unclear and is difficult to mesh with its earlier decision in Sony. The Grokster Court 
acknowledged the Sony Court’s borrowing of the Patent Act’s contributory infringement 
language for copyright law, and then went on to also import the inducement rule from 
section 271(b) of the Patent Act as well. The Court explicitly recognized “the need to 
keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of 
technologies with lawful and unlawful potential,” (Grokster, 2005, p. 937) and so 
qualified its holding by stating: 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses 
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would 
ordinary acts incident to product distribution . . . support liability in 
themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, 
culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise 
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. 
 (Grokster, 2005, p. 937) 
 In the international context, it is this message of Grokster that is most enduring: 
the need to balance the aims of legitimate commerce against the need to promote 
innovation by protecting the rights of intellectual property rights holders. To this end, we 
should consider whether secondary liability holds “a” (though almost certainly not “the”) 




II. SECONDARY LIABILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
 There are numerous international treaties concerning the protection of intellectual 
property (Geller, 2000, ¶ 3[3](b)), including the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works; the Paris Convention; the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”); the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) “Internet Treaties”; 
the Universal Copyright Convention; and the Geneva Phonograms Convention. However, 
these treaties primarily focus on enforcement and procedural issues, not on substantive 
obligations. With very limited exception, these treaties do not deal, directly or indirectly, 
with the notion of secondary liability for infringement.  
 The most significant of current international agreements on intellectual property 
rights is TRIPS, which requires “each WTO member state to provide minimum 
substantive standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement.” (Thomas, 
2005, p. CRS-6) TRIPS also provides a unique exception to the rule that international 
agreements generally do not address secondary liability issues. Article 39 of TRIPS 
provides for the protection of undisclosed secret information (i.e., trade secrets). Footnote 
10 defines “in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” for purposes of Article 
39 as “at least practices such as a breach of contract, breach of confidence and 
inducement to breach . . .” (TRIPS, Art. 39, fn. 10), thus providing a limited exception to 
the rule that international agreements do not address secondary liability. During the 
TRIPS negotiations, the United States proposed language protecting confidential business 
 19
information as a trade secret; this proposal was opposed by many negotiating parties, who 
did not recognize such information as intellectual property. The final language was the 
result of compromise. 
There is no clear international norm demanding imposition of secondary liability 
for intellectual property infringement, even among the major western nations. (Peters, 
2006) Nonetheless, secondary liability is recognized as a basis for intellectual property 
infringement liability around the world in many countries, though it may take different 
forms and bear different labels. There is, therefore, at least some, though perhaps 
minimal, common ground on which the dialogue for international standards can begin. 
 
A. International Implications of Secondary Liability for Intellectual 
Property Infringement: The Grokster Amici Briefs 
 It is helpful to start the analysis of the role, existing or potential, that secondary 
liability for intellectual property law infringement plays in the international arena by 
looking first at the amici briefs filed in Grokster, for two of these briefs focused 
specifically on the issue of whether the international treaty obligations of the United 
States dictated an outcome in that case. Do existing treaty obligations mandate imposition 
of secondary liability for copyright infringement at the national level? 
 A group which labeled itself as “International Rights Owners” (“IRO”) and which 
was self-described as “trade associations and professional associations based outside the 
United States, representing hundreds of thousands of owners of copyrights and related 
rights all over the world” (IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 1), filed a brief in support of the 
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petitioners, the plaintiff members of the entertainment industry. IRO’s argument to the 
Supreme Court was largely a policy-based one, and was grounded in its assertion that 
international treaty obligations compelled U.S. law to impose secondary liability for 
copyright infringement. IRO argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grokster had a 
“potentially devastating impact . . . on the international property landscape,” and had “an 
equally harmful potential disruptive effect on the harmonization of intellectual property 
law and the development and maintenance of uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights in the international arena.” (IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 1) IRO characterized 
Grokster as being “primarily about ensuring that the United States does not falter in its 
responsibilities under various international agreements and norms, by permitting a safe 
haven for entities to set up businesses deliberately designed to enable copyright 
infringement on a massive scale.” (IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 2) 
 IRO argued that international agreements to which the United States was a party 
obligated it to provide intellectual property rights owners (and especially foreign rights 
owners) “adequate and effective means of enforcing such rights.” (IRO Amici Brief, 
2005, p. 5) Their argument had two components. First, IRO argued that the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion would subject international rights owners to infringement on a “massive 
and unprecedented scale” because the decision would prevent such rights holders from 
effectively enforcing against infringement occurring on peer-to-peer networks. (IRO 
Amici Brief, 2005, p. 5) This, IRO argued, threatened “to place the United States in 
breach of its international obligations and responsibilities.” (IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 5) 
Instead, IRO argued, the U.S. Supreme Court should ensure that rights holders had the 
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“important enforcement mechanism” of secondary (i.e., vicarious or contributory) 
liability available to them. (IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 13) 
 Second, IRO argued that if the Ninth Circuit’s decision were to stand, there could 
a “potential spill-over effect” on enforcement of intellectual property rights outside the 
United States, especially where the infringing material emanated from the United States. 
As characterized by IRO: 
Rights owners have always faced the problem of pursuing counterfeit or 
infringing copies produced in countries with lax copyright enforcement 
practices, that cross borders and infiltrate markets in other countries. If 
United States law is now perceived to allow businesses like defendants’ to 
function without restraint, or is perceived as inconsistent and unreliable, 
this spillover problem will be global, massive and impossible to reverse. 
(IRO Amici Brief, 2005, p. 6)  In effect, IRO’s argument was that a failure of the 
Grokster Court to find secondary liability available for copyright right infringement 
under U.S. law would send the global legal system irretrievably down a slippery slope 
leading to an erosion of intellectual property rights around the world.  
 On the other side of the coin was an amicus brief filed by Sharman Networks, 
Ltd., in support of the respondents, Grokster and Streamcast. (Sharman was a defendant 
in the original action in Grokster, but was not a party to the appeal.) Like Grokster, 
Sharman licensed the protocols that enabled peer-to-peer communications over the 
Internet. Sharman took issue with IRO’s arguments, contending instead that nothing in 
the relevant international treaties would impose an obligation on the United States to 
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adopt secondary liability of any type, much less the specific type that IRO asserted. 
(Sharman Amicus Brief, 2005, p. 4) In fact, Sharman argued, “by any measure of 
international norms, the United States not only provides foreign interests with effective 
enforcement procedures and mechanisms, but gives them significant advantages in this 
respect over American copyright owners.” (Sharman Amicus Brief, 2005, p. 5) 
 Perhaps the most compelling argument raised by Sharman, however, was its point 
that IRO was presenting its arguments to the wrong branch of government. As eloquently 
stated by Sharman: “The IRO’s belief that [the United States Supreme] Court should 
concern itself with trade policy, diplomacy, the raising of international norms in 
America’s interest, and the setting of precedents for foreign jurisprudence not only goes 
well beyond the mandate of even this Court, it usurps the role of Congress and has no 
constitutional underpinnings.” (Sharman Amicus Brief, 2005, p. 5) As the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself noted in Sony: 
The judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the 
copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound 
policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress 
when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted 
materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional 
ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology. 
(Sony, 1984, p. 432). 
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Ultimately, the argument between the two amici was over whether international 
treaty obligations do or do not require imposition of secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.  However, it is clear that no such treaty obligations exist, and IRO’s 
argument in this respect was a non-starter. The more interesting and relevant questions 
are: (1) what forms of secondary liability do foreign jurisdictions already provide; and (2) 
should international agreements require or encourage the imposition of secondary 
liability for intellectual property infringement, and if so, what form should those 
standards take? As Sharman correctly pointed out, however, these are issues of trade 
policy and diplomacy to be handled via international policy and agreement, and not 
imposed unilaterally the courts. 
   
B. Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement in Foreign 
Jurisdictions 
Examination of available sources of laws of other countries regarding liability for 
infringement of intellectual property rights reveals a somewhat checkered pattern.3 The 
easy case is where the defendant has committed the infringing act himself or herself, of 
course: this is direct infringement and imposition of liability is straightforward.  
Complexities start to arise when the infringement is more indirect. Countries 
characterize the underlying wrongdoing in manners or terms that are often unfamiliar to 
American lawyers or businesses. For example, as noted by amicus Sharman in Grokster, 
U.S. law treats as direct infringement much behavior that is viewed as “secondary 
infringement” elsewhere in the world. Sharman pointed specifically to infringement of 
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the right of distribution, which is a form of direct infringement under U.S. law, but under 
Canadian law is treated as “secondary infringement” requiring the showing of knowledge 
and acts “to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright.” 
(Canadian Copyright Act, 1985, ch. C-42, s. 27(2)(b))  In addition, in most jurisdictions, 
a defendant is generally liable for “consciously bringing about or assisting in the bringing 
about” of infringements by third parties (Garnett, et al., 1999, p. 471); i.e., for somehow 
contributing to the infringing acts of a third party. (Sterling, 2003, p. 511). Knowledge of 
the infringement is often, but not always, an element of such liability. Under United 
Kingdom law, for example, the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the plaintiff’s copyright 
will relieve the defendant of liability for damages. (U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patent 
Act, 1988, § 97). 
The converse is also true—foreign jurisdictions may treat as direct infringement 
activities that would be viewed as secondary infringement in the United States. For 
example, many countries address copyright infringement in terms of “authorization.” 
Some countries find infringement where the defendant has authorized a third party to 
undertake an action that actually is within the purview of the copyright holder. (Sterling, 
2003, p. 511) Other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) provide that authorizing 
someone else to commit an infringing act is itself direct copyright infringement.4 (U.K. 
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, § 16(2)) The U.S., by contrast, would treat 
authorization as a form of either contributory or vicarious infringement, both a form of 
secondary liability. U.K. law, on the other hand, identifies, among other things, as forms 
of secondary infringement importing an infringing copy of a copyrighted work (U.K. 
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Copyrights, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, § 22), possessing or dealing with an infringing 
copy (U.K. Copyrights, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, § 23) or providing the means for 
making an infringing copy. (U.K. Copyrights, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, § 24) 
 Under U.K. law, authorization “can only come from someone having or 
purporting to have authority, and an act is not authorised by someone who merely enables 
or possibly assists or even encourages another to do that act, but does not purport to have 
any authority which he can grant to justify the doing of the act.” (Ames Records & Tapes, 
1982, p. 106). According to a leading U.K. treatise:  
A person does not necessarily authorize an act to be done merely because 
he intentionally puts into another’s hands the means by which the 
infringing act can be done if those means can also be used for a perfectly 
legitimate purpose, even where it is known that they will in fact inevitably 
be used for an infringing purpose. This will be particularly so if the 
supplier has no control over how the means will be used, since it is the 
essence of a grant or purported grant that the grantor has some degree of 
actual or apparent right to control the relevant actions of the grantee. 
(Garnet, et al., 1999, p. 471) 
Jurisdictions may reach very different results, even in cases with similar facts, 
depending upon how they view the role of “control.” For example, an early precursor to 
the current spate of peer-to-peer file-swapping cases was a series of copying machine 
cases around the world. Courts in Australia, France, and Germany found various 
defendants secondarily liable for providing the copying machines on which others 
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committed copyright infringement of one type or another. (Sterling, 2003, pp. 512-14) 
However, Canadian and United Kingdom courts reached a very different result.  
In the United Kingdom, CBS Songs v. Amstrad centered on a lawsuit against a 
manufacturer of a dual cassette player/recorder. The House of Lords declined to impose 
liability upon the manufacturer, noting that the manufacturer did not control the actions 
of its customers. Similarly, in an earlier case, CBS v. Ames Records and Tapes Ltd., the 
court had refused to hold the operator of shop that rented sound recordings and blank 
tapes liable for infringement even though the operator knew its customers were likely 
committing infringement. The court stated: “The proper approach, consistent with all the 
United Kingdom cases, is that there is no authorisation where, as in the present case, the 
defendant is in no position to control the conduct of the person alleged to have been 
authorized.” (Ames Records and Tapes, 1988, p. 106)  
Control is thus a key factor under U.K. law. Commentators recently summarized 
the status of United Kingdom law as follows: 
The relevant concept in UK copyright is authorisation of 
infringement. The copyright in a work is infringed by any person who, 
without the license of the copyright owner, authorises another person to do 
any of the restricted acts . . . . However, the concept has been applied in a 
relatively restricted way, by employing a test of the degree of authority, or 
control, which the defender had over those who actually carried out the 
infringement. 
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. . . Leading cases [Ames and Amstrad] have held the providers of 
certain facilities . . . not liable despite the fact that their services and 
products rendered infringement easy and probable, the crucial factors in 
each case being that lawful activity was possible with the facilities 
provided, that the defendants had given express warnings to customers 
against use for infringing copying, and that they lacked the necessary 
control over what their customers did with the facilities provided. 
 Where however one or more of these factors is lacking, then 
liability for authorisation is more likely.  
(MacQueen & Waelde, 2006, p. 9) 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada has focused on the element of “control” 
in determining whether copyright infringement exists. In CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court held that a law library that 
provided self-service photocopiers was not liable for infringing copying by its patrons, 
stating that: “a person does not authorize copyright infringement by authoring the mere 
use of equipment (such as photocopiers) that could be used to infringe copyright. In fact, 
courts should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so far as it is 
in accordance with the law.” (CCH, 2004, ¶¶ 38, 43-45) The CCH Court expressly 
rejected a 1976 Australian High Court opinion, Moorhouse v. University of New South 
Wales, which had imposed copyright liability on a university library that provided self-
service photocopiers to its patrons, stating that the Australian court’s decision “shifts the 
balance in copyright too far in favor of the owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes 
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with the proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a whole.” (CCH, 
2004, ¶ 41) Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court seemed concerned with the same balance 
between the public good and the rights of the innovator that the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed in Sony.  
Shortly after the CCH decision, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that an ISP 
that functioned merely as a “conduit” of content was not liable for infringement, stating: 
“The knowledge that someone might be using neutral technology to violate copyright (as 
with the photocopier in the CCH case) is not necessarily sufficient to constitute 
authorization, which requires a demonstration that the defendant did ‘[g]ive approval to; 
sanction; permit; favor; encourage’” the infringement by the end user. (SOCAN, 2004, ¶¶ 
122, 127) 
 Other countries address issues of secondary liability for intellectual property 
infringement in still different ways. For example, under the German civil code, secondary 
liability for copyright infringement arises from code provisions that impose joint and 
vicarious liability upon tortfeasors. (German Civil Code, §§ 830 & 831) German courts 
have found secondary liability appropriate where the defendant has engaged in activities 
such as “promoting a concert at which copyrighted works are performed without 
authority, operating a restaurant or dance hall where music is performed by live bands or 
jukebox, and manufacturing or selling copying equipment, at least if the equipment lacks 
any substantial noninfringing use.” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 272)  
 By contrast, some countries recognize the notion of “inciting” others to commit 
copyright infringement. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code, for example, provides: 
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“Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose 
fault it occurred, to compensate it.”  This section provides the basis under French law for 
imposing liability not only for authorizing another to commit an infringing act, but for 
inciting the infringement of another as well. (Sterling, 2003, p. 511-12)  
 The most recent push on secondary liability for intellectual property infringement 
is coming from the European Union and takes the form of criminal, as opposed to civil, 
sanctions.5 The European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee met in March, 2007 to 
vote on the proposed EU Directive on Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. This directive would criminalize and create 
a new basis for secondary liability for intellectual property infringements (excluding 
patents) not currently found in most European nations–that of “inciting” infringement. 
Article 3 of the proposed Directive states: “Member States shall ensure that all intentional 
infringements of an intellectual property right on a commercial scale, and attempting, 
aiding or abetting and inciting such infringements, are treated as criminal offenses.” The 
directive had its first reading before the plenary session of the European Parliament in 
April, 2007, but was amended to exclude patent infringement, and to reject criminal 
sanctions for copyright infringement in the private, non-profit arena. During the 
parliamentary debate, several members emphasized that the directive was not meant to 
target young peer-to-peer file sharers.  (European Parliament, Mar. 20, 2007) 
 
C. Post-Grokster Secondary Liability in the International Arena for Peer-
to-Peer File Swapping 
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 Within months of the Grokster decision, courts in several other countries also 
faced the issue of secondary liability in the context of peer-to-peer networks. The 
decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd. is discussed separately, and first, because of its 
similarities to Grokster, and then measures taken in other countries are described.  
 
1. Australia: Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman 
License Holdings Ltd 
 Direct infringement occurs under Australian law when a person, without the 
license or permission of the copyright holder, does or authorizes the doing in Australia of 
an act properly within the purview of the copyright holder. (Australian Copyright Act, 
1968, §§ 36, 101) Direct infringement does not require any knowledge or intent on the 
part of the infringer. (Francis Day & Hunter Ltd, 1963) “Authorization” occurs when a 
person “sanctions, approves or countenances” (Nationwide News Pty Ltd, 1996) another’s 
doing of an act that would consist of direct infringement. Thus, direct infringement 
through authorization in Australia is akin to the notion of secondary liability in the United 
States. Indirect infringement under Australian law, by contrast, consists of importing into 
Australia or distributing within Australia infringing copies for a commercial purpose 
without the permission of the copyright holder.  (Australian Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 37, 
38, 102, 103)  There is a mens rea requirement for indirect infringement, but “[i]t is 
sufficient that there be actual or constructive knowledge that intellectual property rights 
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would be infringed, without knowledge of the precise nature of those rights.” (Gilchrist & 
Nott, p. 14, in Cotter, 1997)  
Section 101(1) of the Australian Copyright Act of 1968 imposes liability upon 
someone who “authorizes” a direct act of infringement by another. In addition, the 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) of 2000 provides that, in determining whether 
an unlawful “authorization” has occurred, the court must consider: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act 
concerned; (b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person 
and the person who did the act concerned; (c) whether the person took any 
other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including 
whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice. 
Justice Wilcox of the Federal Court of Australia addressed secondary liability in 
the file-swapping area in 2005 in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License 
Holdings Ltd, reaching an outcome very similar to that of the United States Supreme 
Court in Grokster, though on different grounds. Under Australian law, secondary liability 
for copyright is primarily statutory in origin, as opposed to the common-law origins of 
United States secondary liability for copyright infringement; the difference in underlying 
authority creates a substantial difference in analysis as well. 
According to the Sharman court, “[k]knowledge, or lack of knowledge, is an 
important factor in determining whether a person has authorized an infringement.” 
(Sharman, 2005, ¶ 370)  Authorization, the court noted, need not arise from “express or 
formal permission or sanction,” but rather encompasses as well “inactivity or indifference 
 32
. . . from which an authorization or permission may be inferred.” (Sharman, 2005, ¶¶ 
366-367)   The Sharman court noted that Sharman qualified for the statutory safe harbor 
of Section 112E of the Copyright Act, which provides that: 
A person . . . who provides facilities for making, or facilitating the making 
of, a communication is not taken to have authorized any infringement of 
copyright in an audio-visual item merely because another person uses the 
facilities so provided to do something the right to do which is included in 
the copyright.  
(Australian Copyright Act, 1968, § 112E)  In this sense, Sharman and Grokster are 
similar in that both declined to find that secondary liability attaches merely because a 
defendant provides facilities that are used by others to engage in direct infringement. 
However, the Sharman court went on to state, neither does Section 112E “confer 
general immunity against a finding of authorization.” (Sharman, 2005, ¶ 399) The court 
found additional evidence indicating Sharman had authorized infringement by its end 
users, including limited efforts to prevent its users from engaging in copyright 
infringement and evidence that Sharman had the “power” to prevent or limit such 
infringement, but failed to do so. (Sharman, 2005, ¶ 411)  In this sense, both Sharman 
and Grokster were looking for additional behavior that would support imposition of 
secondary liability. In Sharman, the additional behavior was advertising on Sharman’s 
website that “would have conveyed the idea that was ‘cool’ to defy the record companies 
and their stuffy reliance on their copyrights” (Sharman, 2005, ¶ 405); in Grokster, it was 
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the targeted advertisements and solicitations that induced end users to infringe. (Grokster, 
2005, pp. 937-938) 
Ultimately, the Sharman court issued an injunction in favor of the copyright 
holders, but provided “an opportunity for the relevant respondents to modify the Kazaa 
system in a targeted way, so as to protect the applicants’ copyright interests (as far as 
possible) but without unnecessarily intruding on others’ freedom of speech and 
communication.” (Sharman, 2005, ¶ 520)6 Thus, the Sharman court, like the Grokster 
court, recognized the need to balance the protection of copyright through imposition 
secondary liability with the need to protect free speech and commercial activity. 
 
2. Other Countries’ Responses to Peer-to-Peer File-Swapping 
Activities 
 In the months following Grokster, courts in several nations had the opportunity to 
address assertions of secondary liability in the peer-to-peer file swapping context.7 In 
some instances (e.g., Hong Kong, Spain, and Taiwan), criminal sanctions were issued 
against the defendants. For example,  in October, 2005, a Hong Kong court criminally 
convicted an individual of using BitTorrent technology to illegally distribute copyrighted 
movies via a peer-to-peer network. (MPAA, Oct. 24, 2005) On May 31, 2005, Weblisten, 
a Spain-based website that offered songs for downloading and streaming, admitted to 
criminal copyright infringement, and the site was shut down. (IFPI, June 1, 2005)  And in 
June, 2006, the Spanish Congress passed intellectual property legislation that banned 
unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing in Spain, making it a civil offense to download 
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even for personal use and making it a criminal offense for ISPs to facilitate unauthorized 
downloading. (TMCNET, June 27, 2006) 
 The Taiwanese Copyright Act of 2003 also provides for criminal penalties and 
civil liability of violators of the law. The first Taiwanese file-sharing case, which 
involved both a criminal and a civil action, was brought against Weber Wu, president of 
ezPeer, a for-fee peer-to-peer file-swapping service. The criminal action failed. The 
Shihlin District Court ruled on June 30, 2005 that Wu was not guilty of infringing 
intellectual property rights (Ho, July 1, 2005) because Taiwanese laws did not subject a 
distributor of peer-to-peer file-sharing software to criminal liability. (Kuo & Li, 2006)  
The court also found that ezPeer was not directly liable for copyright infringement and 
that the defendants were not secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring as a 
result of the use of ezPeer services by third parties. (Kuo & Li, 2006) The court stated 
that the copyright law did not impose an independent duty on software developers or 
distributors to monitor or curb infringement by end users and rejected the notion that 
foreign courts’ decisions upholding contributory liability of distributors, such as Napster 
in the United States or Soribada in Korea, were relevant as those case involved civil 
liability, not criminal prosecution. (Kuo & Li, 2006) 
However, the Taiwan International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) had brought a simultaneous civil suit proceeding against ezPeer, and the result 
there was very different. In July, 2006, the parties announced that they had settled their 
dispute by entering into a cooperative agreement in which ezPeer would become 
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Ezpeer+, “the world’s first legal P2P music-download Web site.” (MyEGov, July 7, 
2006) 
 Just three months after the ezPeer ruling, two directors and the president of the 
Taiwanese peer-to-peer file-sharing network, KURO, were criminally convicted of 
copyright infringement in September, 2005 by the Taipei District Court.  Although 
KURO operates in a manner similar to ezPeer, the KURO court found that KURO was 
aware that users were using its product to infringe copyrights, had failed to act to prevent 
such infringement, and had in fact intentionally advertised and distributed its software to 
enable users to download works illegally. (Kuo & Li, 2006) Thus, the court found that 
KURO had knowingly facilitated copyright infringement and was just as criminally liable 
as the end users. The president received a jail term of two years; the two directors (both 
sons of the president) received jail terms of three years. Each of the three was also fined 
US $91,000 as well. (Fang, 2005) At the same time, one of the subscribers was sentenced 
to four months in jail and three years’ probation. (Kuo & Li, 2006) To settle a 
simultaneous civil suit brought by the IFPI, KURO paid approximately US $9 million in 
damages to the record companies and agreed to shut down its operations. (Taiwan 
Intellectual Property Office, June 3, 2006) 
  In a purely civil suit, South Korea largest on-line music service, Soribada, was 
shut down in November, 2005 by the Seoul Central District Court.  The suit had been 
filed by the Korean Association of Phonogram Producers, the Korean equivalent of 
RIAA. (Smith, 2005) Within months of the decision, Soribada announced plans to 
convert to a paid subscription service. (Rosenblatt, March 30, 2006) 
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III.  WHERE TO GO FROM HERE: SECONDARY LIABILITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA  
 It is easy to focus on peer-to-peer networks when looking at secondary liability 
issues for intellectual property right infringement; the prevalence of such networks, the 
ease with which copying and distribution can occur in the digital environment, their 
substantial impact on the market for lawful copies of the copyrighted works, and the 
vigilance of the entertainment industry in seeking out and suing the providers of such 
networks all provide ample fodder for analysis. 
There are without question problems with imposing secondary liability in the file-
swapping arena. Two leading commentators have pointed out several of these problems, 
including: (1) the likelihood that secondary liability rules will ban lawful as well as 
unlawful conduct; (2) the potential that imposition of secondary liability would 
discourage creation of peer-to-peer networks, which are powerful, socially-beneficial 
tools for dissemination of information when used appropriately; (3) the inappropriateness 
of asking facilitators to police in what is essentially a gray area of the law; (4) the agency 
cost problems engendered by the fact that facilitators do not have correct incentives to 
distinguish lawful from  unlawful conduct, and so may unnecessarily take down lawful 
content, thus giving intellectual property rights holders too much power; and (5) 
unintended negative consequences on innovation occasioned by cutting short 
development of technology that might be currently used for primarily unlawful purposes, 
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but which could evolve into lawful technology that creates new and unexpected markets 
for the rights holders (such as the VCR). (Lemley and Reese, 2004, pp. 1379-90) 
The answer to this dilemma, however, is that the current dialogue on secondary 
liability for intellectual property infringement in the international arena is focusing on the 
wrong question—or at least, not upon the fundamental questions that should underpin the 
initial discussion. Even though the Internet may bring indirect infringement activities to 
new highs (or lows, depending upon your view), secondary liability issues are prominent 
in the bricks-and-mortar world as well. Indirect infringement is not just a phenomenon 
created by the evolution of digital technology, and analysis of this subject should not be 
artificially restricted by focusing on this narrow application. However, the current state of 
technology does make transnational copyright infringement much easier than was in the 
pre-digital, pre-Internet era, and highlights the need to create international norms for 
secondary liability that make it easier for business to operate in a global marketplace by 
making it easier for actors to predict outcomes and easier for intellectual property rights 
holders to structure their activities in a way that enables them to adequately protect their 
resources or minimize their liabilities (depending upon which side of the dispute they 
occupy). 
Ultimately, creation of international standards for secondary liability for copyright 
infringement in particular (or intellectual property rights infringement in general) would 
require consensus at the international level that such a standard should exist (as 
memorialized in an international agreement), followed by implementing legislation at the 
national level in all signatory nations. It might well be easier to consider international 
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responses to secondary liability for copyright infringement in the peer-to-peer file-
swapping context if we had a clearer sense of the convergence or divergence of 
international norms on secondary liability for copyright infringement generally.  
So, the bottom-line solution is that we pull away from the current dialogue about 
peer-to-peer file-swapping and commence the discussion instead at the less refined and 
perhaps less charged level of traditional applications of secondary liability outside the 
digital context. When does it make sense to hold another liable for the direct infringement 
of another party? What is the significance of identifying certain behavior as direct 
infringement in some countries and indirect infringement in others? Current national 
standards define secondary liability based upon a number of different factors, including: 
(1) financial benefit; (2) actual control; (3) the right to control (even though unexercised); 
(4) knowledge; (5) contribution; (6) intent; (7) inducement; and (8) incitement. Which of 
these factors makes most sense in the international context, and is there a way of 
synthesizing them down to a few, widely-acceptable factors? Or is there some other, as 
yet-unarticulated standard that should be considered instead?  
 The Supreme Courts of both Canada and the United States have emphasized the 
need to balance the goals of commerce and free markets with the protection and 
encouragement of innovation. These concerns are worthy of substantial debate and 
consideration at the international level, and should underlie any debate on imposition of 
secondary liability. 
 
                                                 
* Copyright 2007 Lynda J. Oswald. 
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1 On July 18, 2007, the RIAA sent its latest round of pre-litigation letters to 408 users at 
23 universities. RIAA activities are described in press releases found at 
http://www.riaa.com/news-room.php. 
2 As explained in Oswald, 2006, at 235-36: 
Grokster is, in fact, the prototypical inducement case: many small, 
individual infringers, each inflicting a small injury and each relatively 
judgment-proof, and one or a few alleged inducers, each possessing 
significantly deeper pockets. The direct infringers in Grokster are the 
multitude of individual users of the peer-to-peer networks, who use the 
networks to illegally download copyrighted materials. Identifying and 
taking action against these individual users is cumbersome, expensive, and 
offensive to those whom the copyright holders would like to have become 
lawful, paying consumers of the copyrighted materials. The courts 
(followed in the patent arena by the legislature) have recognized that in 
instances such as these, it is not only the direct infringers who should be 
held liable but those who encourage and enable such direct infringement 
as well. While the injury inflicted by each individual direct infringer may 
well be very small, the aggregated injury made possible by the 
machinations of the inducer of that direct infringement may be crushingly 
large. 
3 For a general survey of individual countries’ intellectual property laws, see McDonald, 
Suthersanen and Garigues (4th rev. 2006). 
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4 Authorization is a separate act of infringement from the act itself which is authorized. 
See Ash v. Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., [1936] Ch. 489; ABKCO Music v. Music 
Collection Int’l Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 657. 
5 Existing directives on intellectual property infringement include Directive 2001/29/Ec 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society; Directive 
2004/48/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights L 195/16 EN Official Journal of the 




6 An appeal was taken in the case to the full Australian federal court, but the parties 
settled the case in November, 2006 before a decision was handed down. Reportedly, the 
settlement required Kazaa to implement filtering technology to prevent its users from 
distributing infringing copies of files, and Sharman Networks agreed to pay over $100 
million to certain global record labels. See Caroline McCarty, With settlement, Kazaa 




                                                                                                                                                 
7 For a general analysis of secondary liability in the international peer-to-per file-sharing 
context, see Pessach (2007).   In addition to the actions described in this subsection, there 
have been peer-to-peer file sharing suits brought in Japan and China. 
 
 
 
